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Education researchers tend to approach policy analysis retrospectively,paying close attention to outcomes and interests served by the policy
change as well as the impacts of policies on schools, teachers, and students.
These are, of course, important considerations. However, the emphasis on
policy ex post facto conceals our understanding of the conditions that create
policies in the first place. In the following, we explore the emergence of new
policy proposals concerning teacher quality reforms in order to understand
how policy actors build ideological consensus in educational policy systems.
Although partisan divisions run deep in other policy domains in U.S. politics,
in education, policy makers from both political parties have recently sup-
ported teacher effectiveness reforms to improve teacher quality (Wolbrecht
& Hartney, 2014). Teacher effectiveness policies emphasize efficiency, com-
petition, and academic outputs and include teacher evaluation and merit-
based pay. Over the past decade, teacher effectiveness reforms have domi-
nated federal and state policy-making agendas, representing a significant
shift in how policy makers, the media, and the public talk and think about
public education (Galey, 2015).
The framing of policies in public debate, or the policy discourse, is one
way to observe a major policy change. Mehta’s (2013) analyses of recent pol-
icy changes show how a major rhetorical shift in the direction of test-based
accountability propagated the spread of teacher effectiveness policies at the
turn of the 21st century. As Mehta explains, even the way policy actors
define policy problems can change the very nature of a policy debate.
Other scholars also attribute recent federal policy changes to ideological
shifts and new coalitions of interest groups (DeBray-Pelot & McGuinn,
2009; McDonnell & Weatherford 2013). Our analysis links these studies of
broad idea shifts to the role of specific policy actors—idea brokers. We
show how these brokers carry ideas and new problem definitions, providing
mechanisms that helped drive Democrats and Republicans to support similar
policies to address teacher effectiveness.
Major policy change can be observed in debates among networks of
policy actors (Leifeld, 2016). This study uses discourse network analysis
(Leifeld, 2013) of testimony from 200 congressional hearings on teacher
quality from 2001 to 2015. We analyze how new policy preferences arise
and draw support from varied actors over time. Our analysis shows how
early iterations of effectiveness reform under the Bush administration,
such as school-based accountability and merit-based teacher compensation,
helped give rise to the widespread adoption of teacher effectiveness reforms
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during the Obama administration. We find that idea brokerage is associated
with the emerging popularity of particular policy preferences, including
teacher accountability. Theoretically, our project advances and tests the con-
cept of an idea broker, building on the social network concept of brokerage
(Gould & Fernandez, 1989). We show how idea brokerage in the education
policy debate is associated with convergent policy preferences among polit-
ical actors toward teacher effectiveness. Further, our findings suggest that
idea brokers may be more likely to introduce new ideas during a time period
when a policy window is open (Kingdon, 1984)—in this case, during a shift
in party control of congress and the presidency, from 2007 to 2009.
Our findings have implications for contemporary educational politics and
policy making given the opportunity for state-level policy change under the
Every Student Succeeds Act legislation. The decentralized conditions created
by Every Student Succeeds Act suggest that idea brokers will play an increas-
ingly crucial role in state policy making at the state and local levels during the
coming years. In each state, there is an opportunity for renewed debates over
policies to address teacher quality. While some will promote teacher effective-
ness policies, others will support policy ideas that focus on teacher collabora-
tion, teacher compensation and benefits, and the role of teacher unions. Idea
brokers will have an interest in converging policy preferences around their
policy core beliefs. We recommend that researchers studying educational pol-
icy change in the coming years attend to the influence of idea-based policy
networks in state and local policy making. Such analyses can help stakehold-
ers identify idea brokers and anticipate moments of policy change.
Policy Context: From School-Based Accountability
to Teacher Effectiveness Reforms
For the past 15 years, federal and state policy makers have dramatically
expanded teacher effectiveness reforms. Prior to the passage of No Child Left
Behind (NCLB), Republicans typically argued that education should be left
to the states, while Democrats supported major federal programs to advance
equity and increase funding, including Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act. However, during the administrations of
President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama, both major parties
supported accountability reforms, including teacher effectiveness policies.
The adoption of NCLB under President Bush codified test-based accountabil-
ity by formally linking federal funds to educational outputs (McDonnell,
2013). The Obama administration’s Race to the Top (RTTT) program (U.S.
Department of Education, 2009), meanwhile, authorized a $4.35 billion com-
petitive grant program that encouraged states and districts to develop ambi-
tious educational reform agendas, including comprehensive longitudinal
educational data systems to link student achievement data with individual
teachers (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).
Idea Brokerage in Teacher Policy Networks
3
NCLB was adopted with broad bipartisan support—bringing together
a Republican administration and Democratic stalwarts, like Senator Ted
Kennedy. Under NCLB, schools would be held accountable for student
achievement outcomes, including gaps in such outcomes between sub-
groups of students. Among other things, NCLB created sanctions for schools
and districts that failed to achieve ‘‘adequate yearly progress’’ based on stu-
dent test performance (McDonnell, 2013). This legislation built upon a redef-
inition of educational issues advanced by both major political parties,
highlighting excellence and accountability as mechanisms to address educa-
tion issues, rather than emphasizing funding (Mehta, 2013; Wolbrecht &
Hartney, 2014).
While NCLB focused on school-level accountability, the legislation
attempted to address the quality of teachers entering the profession by push-
ing districts to move toward employing ‘‘highly qualified’’ teachers.
However, the definition of a highly qualified teacher focused on subject mat-
ter competency and other professional inputs rather than student achieve-
ment. When it became apparent that the lofty goals of NCLB to reach
100% academic proficiency by 2014 were unattainable, the Department of
Education granted waivers to 43 states that significantly relaxed many of
NCLB’s provisions (U.S. Department of Education, n.d.). Despite these waiv-
ers, Obama’s RTTT program maintained the general course set by the law,
while expanding federal and state attention to teacher effectiveness.
Teacher effectiveness policies aimed to assess the impact of individual teach-
ers on student test score growth, potentially narrowing the scope of perfor-
mance assessment for educators.
In contrast to NCLB, RTTT focused more on incentives and capacity-
building—using the ‘‘carrot’’ rather than the ‘‘stick’’ to motivate reform efforts
(McGuinn, 2012; Mehta & Teles, 2012). RTTT, for example, focused on train-
ing and retention of effective educators and rewarding educators for turning
around the lowest performing schools and districts. RTTT shifted the focus to
outcomes, specifically student achievement as a primary indicator of teacher
effectiveness. Over the past decade, and largely in response to RTTT, three
fourths of the states have adopted teacher evaluation systems that incorpo-
rate student growth measures, as well as statewide data systems to keep
track of student- and teacher-level data (McGuinn, 2012). Many states and
districts now link teacher evaluations to high-stakes personnel decisions,
including tenure, performance pay, and firing (Foderaro, 2010).
In some respects, the rapid expansion of teacher effectiveness policies is
surprising. First, concerns about the unintended negative consequences of
test-based accountability resulting from NCLB (such as an overemphasis
on tested subjects) were already circulating during the latter years of the
Bush administration (Booher-Jennings, 2005; Fuller, Wright, Gesicki, &
Kang, 2007; Hamilton, Stecher, Marsh, McCombs, & Robyn, 2007). Second,
the emphasis on teacher effectiveness is a very direct concern to a major
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Democratic Party constituency: teachers’ unions. Elementary and secondary
teachers are one of the largest occupational groups in the country and are
well known for their high levels of engagement in politics—policies that
directly alter teachers’ practices and employment protections are unlikely
to advance without a mobilized response from teachers (Hartney & Flavin,
2011). At the state level, teacher union strength is associated with a lower
likelihood of a state adopting performance pay policies (Finger, 2018). In
a few instances, teachers’ unions have cooperated with policy makers to
enact teacher effectiveness policies, particularly, at the state and local levels.
However, as teacher evaluation policies have evolved, unions have generally
opposed accountability reforms and other policies that use test score metrics
to evaluate educational quality.
One factor that may undermine the influence of teachers’ unions in edu-
cational politics is the emergence of powerful and well-connected advocacy
organizations that mediate between policy makers and policy implementation
systems, or intermediary organizations. Studies show, for example, that alter-
native certification programs have spread rapidly across urban school districts
with support from federal grant money and generous private foundation fund-
ing (Reckhow & Snyder, 2014). More broadly, recent research reveals the cen-
trality of intermediary organizations in research-use networks that inform
educational policy making (Scott & Jabbar, 2014). Researchers have found
that decision makers are frequently ill-equipped to interpret complex evi-
dence and rely on intermediary organizations to synthesize and interpret
policy-oriented research. Intermediaries can use this powerful brokering posi-
tion, between policy makers and the public, to represent evidence in ways
that build support for particular policies (Jabbar, Londe, Debray, Scott, &
Lubienski, 2014). In the following analysis, we explore exactly how and
when ideas involving teacher effectiveness emerged in the national policy
debate.
Conceptual Framework: Networks of Actors and Ideas
Educational policy is a complex field—crowded with competing actors,
new sources of data and analysis, and ideological perspectives. To grapple
with this complexity, scholars of education policy have begun to turn to
social network theory. This approach to examining education policy
assumes that, in addition to formal bureaucratic structures, education policy
outcomes are shaped through informal relationships between policy actors
(Rhodes, 2006). To date, much of the work utilizing social network theory
in education policy has focused on implementation processes, especially
as it relates to teacher and leadership networks (e.g., Coburn & Russell,
2008; Daly, Finnegan, Jordan, Moolenaar, & Che, 2014; Frank, Zhao,
Penuel, Ellefson, & Porter, 2011; Moolenaar & Sleegers, 2015; Siciliano,
2016). Increasingly, however, researchers who study policy-making process
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are using social network theory to examine how policy makers advance new
ideas through formal and informal structures (Leifeld, 2016).
Particularly at the federal level, policy makers often make decisions in
an information-rich and complex environment, but because of cognitive
and institutional limitations they cannot devote attention to many policy
issues at once—a phenomenon known as ‘‘serial processing,’’ or ‘‘selective
attention processing’’ (Baumgartner & Jones, 2012). Many issues may com-
pete for policy makers’ attention during a ‘‘policy window’’—a limited
period of time when many actors see an opportunity for policy change—for
instance, during the transition to a new presidential administration or the
reauthorization of major legislation (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). To under-
stand how policy makers process information in a crowded and complex
environment, we draw on policy network theory; this approach begins
with the premise that policy makers are both embedded in informal policy
networks (Rhodes, 2006) and participate in formal institutional venues to
acquire policy information and sort through it. As members of policy net-
works, they rely on network ties to transmit and legitimize policy ideas
and solutions, shaping policy outputs and outcomes, while also relying on
institutional rules and norms to guide their decision making. Thus, actors
gather informational signals from the policy environment, which is institu-
tionally and epistemologically bounded by their existing policy beliefs.
Congressional hearings are an important formal venue for communicat-
ing policy information, and information provided in congressional testimony
about policy effectiveness is positively associated with proposal enactment
(Burstein & Hirsh, 2007). Trusted signals about policy ideas and new infor-
mation are likely to come from actors who policy makers agreed with in the
past (Bertelli & Wenger, 2009). Furthermore, actors delivering testimony
could strategically position themselves to advance new ideas if they can pro-
vide information that is relevant and agreeable to members of both political
parties—in other words, by acting as brokers (Heaney, 2006). Actors who
deliver testimony in hearings have the opportunity to provide valuable infor-
mation that policy makers could act upon and advance in the future; but the
receptiveness of policy makers to new information is likely to depend on
their existing preferences and prior agreement with organizations participat-
ing in the hearing.
We operationalize the relationships between organizations and policy
ideas with discourse network analysis. By combining social network analysis
and content analysis, discourse network analysis provides a way to assess
actor relationships through policy beliefs. Discourse network analysis is dis-
tinct from critical discourse analysis, which focuses on qualitative coding of
communications between actors (Perna, Orosz, & Kent, 2019). Discourse
network analysis examines the ‘‘discursive’’ layer of politics where political
debates occur (Leifeld, 2013). A discourse network is constructed by analyz-
ing actors’ attitudes expressed in a public arena (e.g., national media,
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congressional hearings) and creating ties between actors based on shared
views (Leifeld, 2013). For example, two actors who publicly state that
teacher quality should be assessed with value-added models would share
an affiliation in a discourse network.
As Leifeld (2013) observes, in prior studies of policy coalitions, ‘‘the
actual processes of policy learning and policy change largely remain a black
box’’ (p. 171). Discourse network analysis provides a technique to unlock
this black box by examining the emergence of beliefs within a network
and the relationships that develop around shared beliefs and policy prefer-
ences. These networks can be analyzed as two-mode: linking actors through
shared policy preferences; or as one-mode: directly linking actors who share
policy preferences. Moreover, by gathering stated preferences from public
debate over time, it is possible to analyze discourse networks longitudinally.
Brokers of Ideas Within Advocacy Coalitions
Policy ideas and preferences can change over time—new ideas emerge
for addressing policy challenges, and actors adopt new sets of policy prefer-
ences. Our analysis directly addresses this dynamic process. We apply the
concept of brokers to analyze the emergence of new ideas that link actors.
Brokers are actors that have strategic capacity due to their position in the
network (Burt, 2004; Gould & Fernandez, 1989; Heaney, 2006; Obstfeld,
2005). Brokers occupy positions in a network that can provide connections
between other components of the network that would not otherwise share
a direct connection. While brokers are often understood as actors who are
strategically advantaged by their position between disconnected alters
(i.e., structural holes, Burt, 1992), here we understand the process of broker-
age to include instances in which actors serve as a conduit to relay informa-
tion to consolidate distinct sets of ideas (Obstfeld, Borgatti, & Davis, 2014).
Brokerage can occur along more than one mode in network—not only
based on structural ties between individuals, but also through relationships
between different ideas. Applications of two-mode brokerage enable the
analysis of links between one set of nodes, such as policy actors, and
another set of nodes, such as ideas.
In this study, we focus on policy idea brokers, or more simply ‘‘idea
brokers’’; these are actors who bridge across policy preferences, establishing
and strengthening policy consensus. Idea brokering is distinct from tradi-
tional definitions of brokering because it focuses on the role actors play in
joining together sets of ideas. Instead of emphasizing how brokers close
structural gaps between actors, idea brokers consolidate related policies
over time to create a coherent agenda around shared policy beliefs.
Important work on these issues has emerged from Sabatier (1988) who
developed the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) theory of the policy pro-
cess. As Sabatier (1988) explains, he developed the framework to analyze
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‘‘the manner in which elites from different advocacy coalitions gradually
alter their belief systems over time’’ (p. 130).1 Sabatier also wrote about pol-
icy brokers between coalitions, and thus their main concern ‘‘is with keeping
the level of political conflict within acceptable limits,’’ (p. 141). Idea brokers,
rather, operate within coalitions and are concerned with convergence of pol-
icy beliefs.
To organize our analysis of policy change and the rise of new ideas, we
apply ACF (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, & Sabatier, 2014; Sabatier,
1988) to our concept of idea brokers, which explains how coalitions and net-
work structures change over time and develop consensus around new ideas.
A key element of the ACF is its emphasis on the beliefs that policy actors
hold, which comprise three tiers: deep core beliefs, which represent broad
normative values; policy core beliefs, which are issue-specific interpretations
of deep core beliefs; and secondary beliefs, which concern ‘‘policy preferen-
ces’’ expressed both as general ‘‘policy goals,’’ as well as specific ‘‘policy
instruments’’ to achieve those goals.2 Figure 1 shows an illustration of the
ACF system of beliefs with an example from educational policy over the
deep core value of efficiency.
We posit that idea brokers play an important role in policy change by
building consensus around policy preferences within a policy core belief.
Traditional definitions of brokering rely on the concept of structural holes
to define whether or not an actor is a broker. In this version, the broker
must occupy a position between two disconnected actors (see Figure 2, first
panel). However, for two-mode discourse networks of ideas and actors, this
definition is too narrow. Discourse networks are often very dense because
Figure 1. The advocacy coalition framework three-tiered system of beliefs.
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there is a strong tendency for preferential attachment—when an idea is intro-
duced and repeated by a few important actors in the policy discourse, other
actors tend to support that idea. In other words, there is a popularity effect.
Consequently, the large majority of actors are connected by at least one pol-
icy idea making structural holes very rare. In light of this tendency, we use
a more expansive definition of brokering, which allows for brokers to exist
between actors even when there is already a connection between them.
Rather than looking for structural holes, alternative approaches for the
empirical observation of brokering can focus on behavior, other structural
statistics, or both.
Brokering as a kind of behavioral orientation can be characterized as
a social process (for an overview, see Obstfeld et al., 2014). In structural
hole theory, brokering activity is limited to intermediaries that facilitate
access to social resources between disparate parties. Moving beyond the
‘‘intermediary’’ definition, brokering can concern a broad range of social
activity. According to Obstfeld (2005), for example, brokers can facilitate
knowledge transfer, cultivate conflict, or coordinate new collaborative action
between two partners. In this case, the broker is ‘‘simply one of the parties’’
in a triad of three or more actors (Obstfeld et al., 2014, p. 141). Furthermore,
Jasny and Lubell (2015) provide categories of brokering across two modes
and show how different relational structures across both modes can facilitate
collaborative partnerships. Taken together, this multidimensional under-
standing of brokerage suggests that ideas and information flows can serve
as the context for practices that brokers may employ in political coalitions
within discourse networks. We couple this process-oriented perspective of
brokering with the ACF theory of policy change.
Figure 2. Different conceptualizations of brokerage.
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An idea broker is uniquely situated to shape the policy discourse by
facilitating convergence around a set of policy preferences within a particular
policy core belief. According to ACF, preferences associated with policy core
beliefs are the ‘‘glue that by which coalition members stick together’’
(Sabatier & Jenkins, 1999, p. 134). In this context, we posit that idea brokers
facilitate the evolution of ideological coalitions. We further suggest that they
do so, not by maintaining the same ideas but, rather, by diversifying the set
of policy preferences associated with that policy core belief and promoting
those ideas to potential coalition partners. Put differently, they intensify and
evolve the debate within a narrow set of ideological parameters; while the
policy preferences may change the underlying policy core belief does not.
Thus, idea brokers facilitate the ideological mechanisms of change in the
direction of policy convergence. In structural terms, idea brokering occurs
when there is a tendency for closure between two actors around a particular
set of policy preferences. Unlike one-mode brokering (i.e., networks of
direct ties between actors), which generally requires three actors, brokering
in two-mode networks only requires two actors because there is a second
mode—in this case policy ideas.
In Figure 2 we illustrate two kinds of network structures associated with
idea brokering as a process over time. In Time 1, Actor A has created a bro-
kering chain by locating themselves between two otherwise unconnected
preferences. Actor B is also present in the policy debate, but has not yet
taken up the same set of preferences as Actor A. As Figure 2 (second panel)
illustrates Actors A and B both support Preference 1, but only Actor A sup-
ports both Preferences 1 and 2. This shows the first kind of idea brokering
structure: an open brokering chain. Open brokering chains represent a spe-
cific kind of brokering activity, namely, the introduction of a new connection
between two ideas. In order to be part of an open brokering chain in a policy
network, the actor must be uniquely located between two policy preferen-
ces. While other actors may be connected to either of the policy preferences
separately only one actor connects both policy preferences. In this sense,
open brokering chains mark a period of ideological transition, because other
actors are not supporting the same combination of ideas at that time. These
kinds of arrangements do not tell us much about whether or not these ideas
are actually brokered. In Time 2, however, Actor A has successfully brokered
their policy preferences and we see a closed brokering chain involving
Actors A and B. A closed brokering chain, or a ‘‘4-cycle,’’ is characterized
by two actors sharing the same two preferences. Importantly, we assume
that idea brokering occurs within a network of actors that share a policy
core belief and are part of the same ideological coalition. Thus, even if
Actors A and B never interact directly with each other, Actor B can still rec-





We expect idea brokerage to be associated with a change in the policy
discourse over time. To observe policy change, we consider how the policy
debate over teacher effectiveness evolved over time in terms of policy pref-
erence popularity. To observe idea brokering, we examine network motifs
that have two policy actors sharing the same two ideas. As mentioned, in
network terms, this arrangement of nodes and ties is called a ‘‘4-cycle’’
(see Figure 2, third panel). By observing the popularity of different policy
preferences over time alongside the tendency for idea brokerage to occur
within particular policy preferences we can show how idea brokers shape
the policy debate. We also look at open brokering chains made up of one
actor and two otherwise unconnected ideas (see Figure 2, second panel)
to see if and when idea brokers appear to introduce new combinations of
ideas.
Our main hypothesis concerns the relationship between idea brokering
and changes in policy preference popularity over time toward policy conver-
gence. Let us say, for example, that ‘‘teachers must be evaluated and held
accountable’’ and ‘‘use teacher evaluations with growth models’’ are both
policy preferences that support teacher evaluation policies. If Actors A and
B both mention the same preferences in t, creating a 4-cycle, we expect
teacher evaluation policy preferences to gain popularity in t 1 1.
Importantly, teacher evaluation policies would not be popular in t. This pat-
tern of policy change will indicate the presence of idea brokerage. Put dif-
ferently, when 4-cycles bring together actors to support the same policy
preferences in time period t, we expect those preferences to become popu-
lar in t 1 1. We assess the potential impact of idea brokers by examining the
popularity of different categories of policy preferences and comparing that
with the significance of idea brokering across different time periods between
2001 and 2015.
In relation to our main hypothesis, we expect that brokerage will be
most effective during a policy window that coincides with changes in parti-
san control of the federal government due to the election of a new Congress
and a new presidential administration (Kingdon, 1984). We anticipate that
policy makers are particularly interested in hearing and adopting new policy
preferences that are relevant to the fluid political environment that occurs
during such a policy window. Brokers will be more likely to introduce
new ideas during such a transition.
Additionally, we consider some alternative hypotheses to explain policy
change. One alternative is organizational type—particular kinds of actors
will be more likely to shape the structure of the policy network and appear
in 4-cycles. To assess this possibility, we categorize the actors by the organi-
zational types they represent. We also control for actor activity, preference
popularity, and the specificity of policy preferences.




We gathered data for this study from 200 congressional hearings from
2001 to 2015 that contained substantive content on teacher quality. The hear-
ings were downloaded from the U.S. Government Printing Office website.
We identified the hearings based on searching for the term teacher quality
in Congressional hearings on the U.S. Government Printing Office website.
Prior to coding the testimony, we conducted an initial scan of hearings to
ensure that the hearings we coded would be relevant to our study. We
only excluded hearings that lacked substantive discussion of teacher quality
issues, for example, a budget hearing mention of federal funding for
‘‘teacher quality programs,’’ but with no additional discussion of the program
themselves. Once we confirmed that a hearing included even a minimal sub-
stantive discussion of teacher quality, the hearings were uploaded into the
Discourse Network Analyzer software for coding (Leifeld, 2013). We content
analyzed the witness testimony and opening statements by members of
Congress to construct discourse networks based on shared policy preferen-
ces. This step utilized a concept coding procedure that sought to categorize
statements into policy preferences at similar levels of granularity (Saldan˜a,
2012; see appendix for full list of codes in the online version of the journal).
Our coding focused on identifying specific policy preferences related to
the policy core belief that teacher quality could be improved by introducing
competition and addressing efficiency—an emphasis on economic cost-
benefits and optimizing performance (Wood & Theobald, 2003). A team of
human coders read each hearing and coded statements using a specified
set of policy categories (see appendix in the online version of the journal).
The results of this coding process were validated by a research supervisor.
The research supervisor maintained the coherence between individual
coders by cross-checking the work by each coder. There is no formal mea-
sure of intercoder reliability. When there was disagreement between a coder
and the supervisor, we discussed the disagreement and sought a consensual
solution. All spoken and written testimony provided in the hearings were
coded, but the question and answer segments were not.3
Our coding system was designed to identify actors’ support for policy
preferences, which included policy goals and, at the highest level of speci-
ficity presented in the discourse, policy instruments. Thus, whenever possi-
ble, we coded for support for the policy instruments in the codebook. For
example, here is a statement from a hearing on May 11, 2007 that we coded
for a specific policy instrument related to teacher evaluation: ‘‘Use evaluation
systems with multiple measures’’:
Our own investigation into performance pay issues have led to us to
conclude that we need to measure teacher effectiveness in multiple
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ways. Why? Because there are many influences on student learning.
Identifying effective teachers requires evaluating their teacher practi-
ces, assessing their performance and examining the different ways
they get academic results for students. Only about one in three stu-
dents can have a value-added test score ascribed to them. Many of
the tests are not very good, especially in terms of measuring 21st cen-
tury learning.
For discourse that was less specific, but still supportive of the policy prefer-
ences in our codebook, we coded using the policy goals. The following is an
example of a statement linked to the overarching policy goal for teacher
evaluation from a hearing on November 8, 2011:
I believe the committee’s bill takes several important steps forward by
. . . incentivizing States and districts to develop rigorous teacher and
principal evaluations and support systems.
This statement is supportive of teacher evaluation but does not include any
additional specificity on the instruments or policy design of an evaluation
system (e.g., using value-added models, peer observations, multiple meas-
ures, etc.). We also coded statements indicating opposition to specific policy
instruments; however, negative statements about instruments are so rare in
congressional testimony, we do not include these in our analysis.
In this analysis, we focus on five policy preference categories located
within the teacher effectiveness core belief, and developed a policy goal and
lists of specific policy instruments associated with each preference category.
The five broad policy preference categories include (1) school-level account-
ability, (2) individual teacher accountability, (3) using performance incentives
to motivate educators, (4) effectiveness of teacher preparation, and (5) alterna-
tive certification. For example, under the main policy goal for teacher account-
ability, ‘‘Teachers must be evaluated and held accountable,’’ we coded for the
policy instrument, ‘‘Use evaluation systems with value-added models.’’ We
coded statements that aligned with these preferences accordingly. See Table
1 for a complete list of the codes for each of the preference categories.
Method
We applied a multistage, multimodal approach to test our hypotheses. In
the first stage, we used the policy preference coding that we completed in the
Discourse Network Analyzer software to observe shifts in policy preference
popularity over time. We examined patterns of preference popularity to iden-
tify key cut-points during our 15-year time period when widely shared ideas
shift to new ideas (see Figure 3). Based on our assessment, we focused on the
following time periods to create our networks for analysis: 2001–2006 for the
Bush administration, 2010–2015 for the Obama administration, and 2007–2009
for the policy window including the shift in party control of Congress and the
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presidency. We then created three separate two-mode networks using
Netdraw (Borgatti, 2002) and Adobe Illustrator with policy actors on the first
mode and the preferences that they mentioned during that time period on the
second mode. Each visualization shows a weighted network of actors by pol-
icy preferences, which represents a summary of all the actors that mentioned
preferences from our list of codes in Table 1 during each time period.
Table 1
Policy Goals and Instruments
Category Preference Code (Goals Are Indicated With Bold Text,
With Specific Policy Instruments Listed Below Each Goal)
School-based
accountability
Hold schools accountable for student performance
Maintain/establish a system of annual high stakes testing
Use standardized testing to measure individual teacher inputs
Use school level testing to assess teacher quality
Teacher
accountability
Teacher must be evaluated and held accountable
Use evaluation systems with growth models
Use evaluation systems with multiple measures
Use evaluation systems with student feedback
Use evaluation systems with classroom observations
Use evaluation systems with value-added models
Use evaluation systems with peer reviews
Incentive-based
improvement
Teachers and educational leaders respond to
performance-based incentives
Use pay for performance
Use performance measures for personnel decisions (retention/
dismissal, promotion, and/or tenure)




Teacher preparation and professional development
must be more efficient and effective
Use teacher evaluation systems to assess the quality of teacher
preparation programs
Use evaluations to improve professional development
Use evaluations to provide ongoing feedback to teachers
Use evaluations to identify and emulate the best teachers
Alternative pathways Good preparation for teaching does not require training
in an education school
Enact alternative certification programs that provide licenses to
new teachers without a degree from a school of education
Enact alternative certification programs to attract more
competitive individuals to the teaching profession
Note. Preferences reflect beliefs, that are then expressed through a particular goal, and the
strategies to meet the goal are instruments (see Figure 1).
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As the descriptive analysis reveals, there is a sudden and substantial
increase of activity in 2007 in this policy arena. This activity drops in 2008,
which is an election year and increases again slightly in 2009. While we can-
not draw any definitive conclusions, based on historical record it appears
that this policy window opened up in response to a shift in power in the
U.S. Congress. In 2007, Democrats took control of Congress making way
for major policy change. Additionally, congressional hearings on the reau-
thorization of No Child Left Behind began in 2007. As scholars have pointed
out (Galey, 2015; DeBray-Pelot & McGuinn, 2009), despite increasing polar-
ization between Republicans and Democrats in recent years, education pol-
icy has been one of the major areas of agreement between the two parties. In
addition, the time period of the policy window in our analysis also aligns
roughly with the period when RTTT was developed (in 2009), marking
a transition from Bush-era policies to Obama-era policies. Thus, we desig-
nated the time periods from 2007 to 2009 as our policy window.
In the second stage of our analysis, we used exponential random graph
models (ERGMs) to determine and compare patterns of behavior across the
three time periods (for an overview of the model, see Cranmer & Desmarais,
2011). ERGM analysis was performed in R using the statnet (Handcock et al.,
2016) suite of packages. ERGMs are a powerful tool to model the endoge-
nous configurations as a way of explaining network structure. Like a logistic
regression, the dependent variable is a binary variable for the presence or
absence of a tie (although weighted versions exist—see Wilson, Denny,
Bhamidi, Cranmer, & Desmarais, 2017). We apply a two-mode version of
an ERG model, which estimates the probability of a tie between an actor
Figure 3. Policy preferences mentioned over time, 2001–2015.
Idea Brokerage in Teacher Policy Networks
15
and a policy preference. In contrast to traditional regression analysis, how-
ever, where the dependent variable is assumed to be only influenced by
exogenous variables, ERGM analysis accounts for interdependencies
between observations. This is a crucial assumption in the present analysis,
as our theoretical framework anticipates that shifts in policy preferences
take shape within dynamic networks of actors and ideas. In addition,
ERGMs permit specific kinds of interdependence among observations.
ERGM analysis usually includes a term for edges, which functions like the
intercept, as well as endogenous network terms and exogenous terms for
node-level attributes.
Network (Endogenous) Terms
Actor activity. This term captures the tendency of actors to have multiple
policy preferences, using geometrically weighted degree counts for the first
mode (actors) in the network (Hunter, 2007). This term counts how many actor
nodes have one connection to a policy preference, two connections, and so on,
and places a lower weight on larger numbers of connections using a geometric
decay parameter. The closer decay is to zero, the more lower degree nodes are
considered relative to higher degree nodes. The assumption is that larger num-
bers of connections are less prevalent than fewer connections.
Preferential attachment. This term accounts for the popularity effect of
ideas using geometrically weighted degree counts for the second mode (pref-
erences) in the network. This term marginally decreases weighting as degree
increases using a geometric decay parameter. The closer decay is to zero, the
more lower degree nodes are considered relative to higher degree nodes.
During the evolution of networks, the more existing ties one node has, the
more connections it is likely to accumulate. Conceptually, it is related to the
theory of cumulative advantage in science, known as the ‘‘Matthew Effect’’
(Merton, 1968). In this context, it infers that the ability of idea brokers to per-
suade other actors to support the preferences they promote may increase with
the preferences’ centralities in the network.
Node-Level (Exogenous) Attribute Terms
Organizational type. This is the organizational type of the actors in the
network. This term captures the effects of organizational affiliations on net-
work formation. The actor categories include government actors, legislators
(member of the U.S. Congress), intermediaries (think tanks, foundations,




Policy preference category. This is a categorical attribute that applies to
the second mode (preferences) in our networks. This will tell us how pop-
ular, or unpopular, particular policy preferences are during any given time
period.
Policy goal/instrument. This categorical attribute applies to the second
mode (preferences) in our networks. This acts a control variable for whether
or not a policy preference is a policy goal or a policy instrument, according
to our coding scheme.
Finally, we tested our main hypothesis by simulating networks from
baseline models of our ERGM analysis in order to identify brokering chains
in each time period. Sometimes theoretical terms of interest are just not pos-
sible to fit within the model. In these cases, we can simulate from an ERG
model resulting in networks that have the tendencies fit by the model,
and extract counts of the statistic of interest (Mayhew, 1984). We compare
these counts from the ERGM simulation with the empirical data and are
then able to tell whether, had the term been fit by the model, the resulting
term would have been significantly positive or negative (e.g., see Jasny,
2012). This treats the simulation as a complex baseline model. The two terms
of interest to us here are brokerage and closure, which are equivalent to our
two structural terms in the idea brokering process (Figure 2). Brokerage
occurs when one actor mentions two preferences that are not co-mentioned
by any other actor, creating an open brokering chain. This actor has thus
made a new connection between the concepts, brokering them as it were—
although only one actor is involved and actors could still be connected
through another idea. We are especially interested in the closure of these
arrangements, or closed brokering chain—a ‘‘4-cycle.’’ This is when two
concepts are co-mentioned by two (or more) actors, showing a tighter con-
nection between the ideas. Both are interesting processes in policy networks
(Leifeld & Schneider, 2012) that estimate different stages of the idea broker-
ing process.
Findings
We begin with a descriptive examination of the policy preference net-
works. Figure 4 shows the diagrams and summary information for each of
the three networks. Taken together, the networks illustrate the transforma-
tion of the debate between the Bush and Obama administrations. For
instance, during the Bush administration, school-based accountability was
a major topic of debate and received support across a wide range of policy
actors. Senator Mike Enzi (R-WY) provides an example of a school-based
accountability preference in a January 6, 2005 congressional hearing:
The centerpiece of that effort, the President’s No Child Left Behind
Act, emphasized accountability and the importance of getting results
Idea Brokerage in Teacher Policy Networks
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Figure 4. Network diagrams and information for different time periods.
Galey-Horn et al.
18
in the classroom. Thanks to that important legislation, our Nation’s
classrooms are more effective and efficient places of learning and
our children are benefiting from that.
Meanwhile, few actors expressed a preference for teacher-based account-
ability during 2001–2006.
However, following the transition to the Obama administration, it was
evident that teacher-based accountability—alongside school-based
accountability—became the central policy belief among the congressional
hearing participants. In addition to the centrality of teacher-based account-
ability, a number of other teacher-based preferences concerning teacher
evaluation emerged during this time, signaling a broader shift in the debate
concerning the role of teachers in education reform. For example, Senator
Tom Harkin (D-IA), explained in a hearing on November 8, 2011:
I believe the committee’s bill takes several important steps forward by
. . . incentivizing States and districts to develop rigorous teacher and
principal evaluations and support systems, with the goal of continu-
ous instructional improvement.
Similarly, in a congressional hearing held on February 28, 2013, Todd Rokita
(R-IN) stated the following:
And we all want qualified teachers in the classroom but we must also
recognize that a teachers’ excellence cannot be measured simply by
degrees and diplomas alone. Recognizing the antiquated ‘‘Highly
Effective Teacher’’ requirements alone weren’t helping schools attract
the most promising teachers to the classroom, some states and school
districts have been working to implement alternative methods to bet-
ter evaluate the effectiveness of teachers.
Rep. Rokita’s statement refers to a key potential source of new
ideas—leaders from states and local school districts that have tried new pol-
icies; these actors may provide recommendations for the expansion or
nationalization of their policy reforms.
There were other notable trends in policy preferences expressed in
hearings over time. During both administrations, many policy actors empha-
sized specific policy preferences for reforming teacher preparation and pro-
fessional development by linking evaluation systems to preservice and in-
service teacher education. Relatedly, alternative certification programs,
which provide licenses to new teachers without a degree from a school of
education, had consistent support over both administrations. Support for
pay for performance policies remained fairly strong in the Obama adminis-
tration, but was mentioned more frequently during the Bush administration.
Overall, these trends indicate support for policies focusing on efficiency,
competition, and an increasing emphasis on specific policies related to
Idea Brokerage in Teacher Policy Networks
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individual teacher accountability. Next, we identified major policy actors
based on their degree counts—or how many preferences each actor men-
tioned— during the policy window.
Major actors during the policy window cover a range of organizational
affiliations (see Table 2). These actors are the most active contributors of
teacher effectiveness policy preferences in Congressional hearings.
Notably, two school districts that have been at the center of education
reform involving teacher quality—New York City and Washington,
D.C.—were also central participants in the debate during the policy window.
Gadsden County Schools and the Richardson Independent School District,
which are located in the metropolitan areas of Tallahassee, Florida and
Dallas, Texas respectively, were also major actors during the policy window.
Indicative of the shift toward teacher-based accountability, The New Teacher
Project (a national organization involved in advocacy, research, and school
district partnerships related to teaching) was a central actor during this tran-
sitional period. A number of think tanks, particularly the Center for American
Progress, Education Trust and the Aspen Institute were major actors as well.
The relatively high level of activity of the Obama administration is also nota-
ble and is indicative of the administration’s push for its RTTT initiative.
Table 2
Major Actors During 2007–2009 Policy Window
Policy Actor
No. of Teacher Effectiveness
Preferences Mentioned
DC Public Schools 14
Obama administration 13
Aspen Institute 12
Center for American Progress 12
Education Trust 12
New York City Department of Education 8
Council of Chief State School Officers 7
DC Preparatory Academy 7
Gadsen County Schools 7
National School Boards Association 7
Richardson Independent School District 7
The New Teacher Project 7
Alliance for Excellent Education 6
Chicago Public Schools 6
Minneapolis Public Schools 6
Stanford University 6
Boston Teacher Residency 5
Johns Hopkins University 5




Our broker analysis focused on identifying closed brokerage chains,
which we accomplished by calculating a 4-cycle count for each actor.4 We
show the major brokers during each time period in Table 3. A somewhat var-
ied mix of thinks tanks, foundations, and interest groups appear in these lists,
including the Aspen Institute, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the
Business Roundtable, and New Leaders for New Schools. A few organizations,
such as Education Trust and the American Enterprise Institute, appear as
brokers in more than one time period, but none appear in all three time peri-
ods. Additionally, local and state education authorities are involved in idea
brokering. School districts are more prominent in brokering chains during
the policy window, while state education authorities become prominent in
brokering chains during the Obama period. Table 3 highlights this finding.
Many of these brokers offered specific policy ideas and information
based on trying approaches to evaluating teachers in their districts. For
instance, Atlanta Superintendent Beverly Hall testified on July 17, 2008:
So we looked at improving the central office staff, our principals, and
our teachers throughout hiring, through making it clear what expect-
ations were, by using meaningful evaluations linked to student out-
comes, and continuous professional development.
The chancellor of the Washington, D.C. public schools, Michelle Rhee, tes-
tified multiple times during the policy window of 2007 and 2009. In her tes-
timony on September 16, 2009, Rhee stated:
First, there’s a lot of discussion these days about how—what the right
way to evaluate teachers is. And we really believe in holding teachers
accountable and using student achievement gains and test scores as
one part of the way that a teacher should be evaluated.
It is important to note that the brokers were not universal in their pref-
erences for teacher accountability. Although most of the actors identified as
brokers spoke in favor of adopting policies for teacher accountability, one
particular broker witness describes sources of uncertainty about using
teacher accountability policies. Representing the American Enterprise
Institute (a broker organization in 2007–2009 and 2010–2015), Frederick
Hess stated the following on September 30, 2009 (a statement we coded
as expressing ‘‘uncertainty’’ about a preference):
Why not just judge teachers using value-added scores? A small but
growing number of states can perform ‘‘value-added’’ calculations
based on grade three-to-eight reading and math assessments.
However, such scores are only available for a minority of teachers,
even in states with the requisite data systems. A more fundamental
problem is that these measures are imprecise and of uncertain














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































reliability when just a few years’ worth of data are being used to
judge individual teachers. . . . Enabling district and school officials
to use value-added gains and other metrics as one component of
a smart, system-specific strategy makes good sense, but prescribing
the use of such crudely drawn metrics from Washington is an entirely
different matter.
This statement from Hess is unique in our testimony—witnesses rarely pro-
vide lengthy discussions of uncertainty about any policy ideas. For instance,
in the very same hearing on September 30, 2009, Layla Avila of The New
Teacher Project stated, ‘‘Let’s create evaluations that differentiate great teach-
ing from good, good from fair, and fair from poor. And use student growth as
a critical component.’’ Based on the growth in popularity of teacher evalua-
tion preferences it appears that policy makers were more attentive to the
ideas shared by the majority of brokers who were highly supportive of
teacher accountability, rather than the uncertainty and reservations
expressed by Hess. The ERGM analysis provides further examination of
how brokers might have impacted the policy discourse.
ERGM and Baseline Simulation Analysis
We used ERGM analysis and baseline simulations to assess our expect-
ations about the role of idea brokers in the emergence of teacher effective-
ness policy preferences during the Obama administration. Unlike our
visualizations, these models use unweighted two-mode networks of organi-
zational actors and policy preferences. The coefficients in Table 4 are similar
to logit coefficients; they can be interpreted as conditional log-odds of a tie
between an actor and a policy preference (a dyad), but the probability of
observing any tie is conditional on all the other dyad outcomes in the net-
work. To interpret the effects of the categorical variables we can exponen-
tiate the coefficients to get the log-odds ratio between the reference group
and any category. If, for example, we exponentiate the teacher accountabil-
ity coefficient of 0.46 from the Obama period we can conclude that actors
are 2.71 times more likely to mention teacher accountability preferences
than alternative certification preferences from 2010 to 2015. In all models,
we include a term for edges, which accounts for the baseline odds of creat-
ing a tie in the network. In addition, we used members of Congress and
alternative certification as reference categories for organizational type and
preference category variables, respectively. Neither category had significant
effects on the model overall and both categories represented the smallest
percentage of their node attribute in comparison to the other categories.
The models presented show the same terms for all three time periods:
Bush (2001–2006), policy window (2007–2009), and Obama (2010–2014).
The results of the ERGM models show that organization type had almost
no effect on the network structure. During both the Bush time period and
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during the 2007–2009 policy window, organization type was not significant.
In particular, intermediaries, which have been agents of change in past
research do not appear to have any significant effects on mentions of teacher
effectiveness policies in our analysis. Interestingly, the only significant orga-
nizational effects appear during the Obama administration when govern-
ment actors appear to be more likely to show support for teacher
effectiveness policies than other kinds of actors.
In contrast, there are a number of significant results based on policy
preference categories. As the descriptive analysis suggests, actors were
more likely to support school-based accountability preferences during
both the Bush years and the policy window. By the time of the Obama
administration, however, school-based accountability preferences are no
longer popular. Incentive policies, meanwhile, clearly emerge and gain pop-
ularity during the policy window and continue to be popular within the pol-
icy discourse during the Obama years. The results for teacher accountability
are particularly worthy of attention. While teacher accountability is not pop-
ular during either the Bush period or the policy window, these preferences
become popular during the Obama period. Finally, teacher preparation
Table 4
Results of Exponential Random Graph Model Analysis
Probability of a Tie Between









Edges 20.39 21.19** 20.42*
Node attributes (Mode 1)
Government actor 0.47 0.15 0.33*
Intermediary 0.47 0.19 0.06
Traditional actor 0.04 0.22 20.02
Node attributes (Mode 2)
Incentives 0.05 1.34*** 0.36*
School-based accountability 0.70* 1.29*** 0.23
Teacher accountability 20.52 0.44 0.46**
Teacher preparation 0.96*** 1.54*** 0.42**
Policy goal/instrument 21.91*** 21.35*** 21.13***
Endogenous terms
Actor activity (mode 1, a = 1) 24.03*** 23.68*** 23.57***
Preferential attachment (mode 2, a = 1) 21.34 0.14 26.25***
AIC 22405.78 22083.31 21985.71
BIC 22340.80 22018.08 21919.26
Log likelihood 1213.89 1052.66 1003.85
Note. AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion.
*p\ .05. **p\ .01. ***p\ .001.
Galey-Horn et al.
24
policies are popular throughout all three time periods, suggesting that the
popularity of some preferences remains relatively constant while the popu-
larity of other preferences evolves over time.
Notably, preferential attachment is not significant in either of the first
two time periods, but is highly significant in the Obama period. A negative
coefficient for preferential attachment is interpreted as a positive effect in an
ERGM model (see appendix, in the online version of the journal, for further
discussion), which means preferential attachment emerges as a significant
factor for tie formation in the policy discourse during the Obama years.
Actor activity, meanwhile, is evident as a significant predictor of tie forma-
tion across all time periods.
Next, the results of the baseline simulations show different results for
open and closed brokering chains. For open brokering chains, which
included one actor occupying a unique space between two preferences
that are not connected by any other actors, organizational type had signifi-
cant effects, while policy preference categories did not (see Figure 5).
Figure 5 shows the results of the baseline simulations for open brokering
chains by organizational type (top) and preference categories (bottom).
Notably, intermediary organizations were significantly more likely to be
involved in open brokerage chains during the Bush years and the 2007–2009
policy window. Significance in this sense means an actor from an intermediary
organization was more likely to be the only actor to endorse a particular pair of
policy preferences than we would expect by chance. During the 2007–2009 pol-
icy window, for example, Amy Wilkins from Education Trust was the only actor
to support using teacher evaluation systems both to assess the quality of teacher
preparation programs and to employ value-added models to evaluate teachers.
While other actors supported these preferences separately, Wilkins uniquely
supported both. Traditional actors (teachers, union representatives, and univer-
sity affiliates) were also significantly more likely to occupy open brokering
chains during the policy window, while government actors and members of
Congress were significantly less likely to do so. None of the policy preference
categories were more or less likely to occupy open brokering chains during any
time period. Interestingly, open brokering chains were rare and appeared
prominently during the policy window, signaling the possible importance of
open brokering chains during periods of policy change.
In contrast, the policy preference categories were significant for closed
brokering chains, while organizational type appears to have little effect (see
Figure 6). We see no effects for organizational type, except during the
Obama period when government actors emerge as significant actors in bro-
kering chains. This aligns with the results of the ERGM analysis.
In Figure 6, however, we see that policy preference categories were
more likely to occur in closed brokering chains in different time periods.
In the Bush period, alternative certification, incentive and teacher account-
ability preferences are all significantly more likely to be present in closed
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brokering chains. During the policy window and the Obama period, mean-
while, brokering chains are significantly more likely to include incentive and
teacher accountability preferences. Alternative certification policies also
reappear as significant components of closed brokering chains.
When considered alongside the ERGM analysis, the brokering analysis
provides evidence to support our main hypothesis. In particular, the teacher
accountability and incentive preferences reveal a pattern of brokering fol-
lowed by an increase in the popularity of these preferences. In Table 5,
we highlight when popularity for preferences emerges following a period
of idea brokering.
The ERGM analysis shows that teacher accountability preferences are
not popular during the Bush period or the policy window, while the broker-
ing analysis shows that these preferences are significantly more likely to
occur in closed brokering chains during these periods. In the following
time period—during the Obama administration—teacher accountability pol-
icies become popular. Likewise, incentive preferences are not popular dur-
ing the Bush period, but they are significantly more likely to appear in closed
Figure 5. Simulation results for open brokerage chains.
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brokering chains during this time period. Then, during the policy window,
incentive policies emerge as a popular policy preference. It is also notable
that, when the preference becomes popular, there is large increase in the sig-
nificance of the simulation results. For teacher accountability, for example,
there is markedly greater distance between the expected value and the
empirical result during the Obama period in comparison to the two previous
time periods. This is also true for incentive preferences during the policy
window (see Figure 6). This suggests that brokers may play a different
role once a preference becomes popular. The baseline simulation results
for open brokering chains, meanwhile, suggest that certain interest groups
may play a particular kind of brokering role by making new connections
between preferences in the policy discourse during the policy window.
Discussion and Conclusion
This article contributes theoretically, methodologically, and substan-
tively to the study of brokers in policy networks and their potential role in
Figure 6. Simulation results for closed brokerage chains (4-cycle).
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policy change. Past research has illustrated the ways that a variety of inter-
mediary actors in education have reached a general consensus on support-
ing choice-based reform organizations in education, especially among
philanthropic foundations and education advocacy organizations (Ferrare
& Reynolds, 2016; Ferrare & Setari, 2018; Reckhow, 2013; Reckhow &
Snyder, 2014; Scott, 2009; Scott & Jabbar, 2014). We show how brokers in
policy networks facilitate knowledge transfer and consensus in the public
discourse about public school teachers.
Theoretically, we expand on previous work that highlights the rising
importance of ideas in policy change processes. While past scholarship
has successfully explicated idea-based politics through the prism of shifting
paradigms and/or idea sets (e.g., Mehta, 2013), our analysis provides further
detail on the mechanisms behind idea-centered policy change. We are not
the first to suggest that brokers play a key role in facilitating change in policy
networks, but we offer insight into the temporal and structural nature of the
brokering phenomenon in idea-centered reforms by linking the brokering
process to discourse networks.
Our analysis has particular importance for understanding the formation
and evolution of political coalitions in educational policy. We show that the
time-specific context of ideas matters. The presence of brokering between
preferences that are not popular, but then become popular in a later time
period—as we see in our data—provides evidence that idea brokers
Table 5
Comparison of Popularity and Brokerage over time








School-based accountability Popularity * ***
Brokerage
Teacher accountability Popularity **
Brokerage 1 1 11
Incentive-based improvement Popularity *** *
Brokerage 1 11
Teacher preparation and support Popularity *** *** ***
Brokerage – –
Note. The asterisks [*] correspond to the significance level from the ERGM results, denot-
ing the popularity of each preference category. The plus and minus signs [1/–] corre-
spond to the significance of the empirical number of homophilous 4-cycle brokering
chains that contain each preference category. Gray shading denotes when there were sig-




contribute to policy convergence around a particular core belief—in this
case teacher effectiveness—within like-minded coalitions. Here we observe
a major policy shift within a coalition, with actors who share policy goals
focused on efficiency also converging on support for a growing set of policy
instruments. Major policy change is often studied between coalitions and
couched as one coalition replacing another, but this is not always the
case. Sometimes a dominant coalition extends its reach into new areas
when brokers within that coalition promote new ideas. Thus, our approach
is a theoretical advance of policy change within coalitions—a particularly
important endeavor when one coalition is dominant.
Our findings also suggest that idea brokers may play a different role
depending on the context. After teacher accountability preferences emerge
as popular policy ideas in the Obama period, for example, idea brokering
is very prominent. At the same time, preferential attachment also becomes
a critical factor in shaping the network—actors are supporting preferences
because they are popular. At this point, the popularity of these ideas has
taken on a life of its own, suggesting a different kind of role for idea brokers.
While idea brokers may continue to operate, they may be acting more as
coordinators, maintaining the dominance of a particular set of ideas, rather
than acting as agents of change. Likewise, our results show that some inter-
est groups may play an important role by making new connections between
ideas in the policy discourse during policy windows when government
actors are likely more open to policy change.
Methodologically, we show the usefulness of statistical network model-
ing for understanding the behavior of policy coalitions in educational con-
texts. While this kind of analysis is commonplace in studies that focus on
the sociology of education (e.g., Frank et al., 2011), there is little research
of this kind that focuses on the politics of education. We build on and
expand existing research on educational policy and politics that examines
organizational networks (e.g., Hodge, Salloum, & Benko, 2016). Our find-
ings further show how ERGM analysis can be used to observe two-mode net-
work structures and examine policy change.
Our study also has implications for studying brokering in policy net-
works. By observing the prominence of different policy preferences over
time alongside the tendency for idea brokerage to occur among particular
sets of preferences we can show how idea brokers shape the policy debate.
The use of different time slices in our analysis illustrates the importance of
timing for brokering, which appears to be most effective during policy win-
dows. In alignment with network theory, this suggests that brokers’ locations
provide them with opportunities to shape the policy discourse. Our
approach may also inform other educational research, and particularly
research on educational change, that uses social network analysis which,
in the past, have focused on one-mode interpersonal networks (e.g., Daly
et al., 2014). Our analysis shows that organizational change can be linked
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to other entities, like ideas. In other kinds of educational research this could
be something else, like attitudinal dispositions or experiences, such as atti-
tudes toward teaching or professional development events.
Substantively, this study informs the growing literature on intermediary
organizations in educational politics, which focuses on identifying key actors
by organizational type. Our results indicate that researchers may consider an
expanded definition of intermediaries in educational politics. While the bulk
of research on intermediary organizations has focused on the influence of
nonprofit organizations, such as think tanks, advocacy groups, and founda-
tions, our analysis also shows that many other types of organizations can act
as idea brokers in policy networks. Our finding that major school districts are
central actors in forwarding particular policy agendas—in this case teacher
effectiveness reforms—is especially relevant. Past accounts of philanthropic
giving in educational politics has identified districts as important conduits of
reform movements (Kretchmar, Sondel, & Ferrare, 2014; Reckhow, 2013;
Scott, 2009). Scott (2009), for example, shows how school districts can be
used as proving grounds for networks of reformers aiming to expand charter
school policies. Our analysis also shows the importance of some university-
based actors and politicians in setting the policy agenda. Overall, researchers
may consider using network structure, rather than a substantive categoriza-
tion, to identify intermediaries in education policy-making processes.
Last, our research has implications for analysis of future developments in
U.S. educational policy, including state-level responses to the newly adopted
Every Student Succeeds Act legislation. As states develop plans for assess-
ments and standards—including metrics for evaluating new categories of
educational outcomes—idea brokers could play a crucial role in shaping
state policy agendas. Yet these debates are also taking place in a fluid polit-
ical context, which might be shaped by rising partisan polarization within
education policy (Barnum, 2016). Future research could produce a fruitful
and more detailed understanding of the rise of policy ideas in education
across different levels of government, or within state contexts with varying
levels of partisan polarization. In particular, by identifying idea brokers dur-
ing policy windows, researchers can identify actors that may serve as impor-
tant leverage during the policy-making process. Whether or not ties to idea
brokers result in changes to legislative votes would make an important con-
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1Conceptually, this process can be linked to theories of idea-based policy change.
Grounded in the process of social learning, idea-based theories of policy change maintain
that policies are a consequence of past policies (Heclo, 1978). Weir and Skocpol (1985),
for example, argue that the interests of policy makers and their policy preferences are
shaped by ‘‘policy legacies’’ or ‘‘meaningful reactions to previous policies’’ (p. 119).
2Our use of ‘‘preferences’’ is conceptually somewhere in between ACF’s secondary
beliefs and policy core beliefs. While the ACF places their ‘‘policy core preferences’’ at
the policy core belief level, we located it at the secondary belief level. This was reasonable
for our purposes because we were conducting analysis inclusive of one policy core belief.
In addition, we needed to distinguish between different types of preferences—the goals
and instruments—while keeping them within the same level of beliefs. It did not make
sense to locate policy instruments at the policy core belief level.
3Our decision to exclude the question-and-answer segments of the hearings is based
on Fisher, Waggle, and Leifeld’s approach to discourse network analysis of congressional
testimony on climate change. We elected to analyze only witness statements that demon-
strate specific policy preferences, as opposed to the back-and-forth dialogue between wit-
nesses and policy makers. Like Fisher, Waggle, and Leifeld, we determined that this
decision would provide a reliable and systematic process for coding. Witness statements
are entered into the record with consistency in duration, form and style, whereas
question-and-answer portions are frequently dominated by some voices over others;
are dependent on background context that is neither included in the record nor can be
specifically linked to a single witness; and vague or off-topic.
4We focused on brokers located in closed brokering chains because they were far
more numerous than those located in open brokering chains. Further, while our analysis
revealed some interesting patterns related to open brokering chains, closed brokering
chains represented the policy process of most interest: convergence around a particular
set of policy preferences.
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